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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/03/2004

Accident number: 51

Accident time: 07:30

Accident Date: 08/07/1998

Where it occurred: Cap Agua (reservoir),
Uige

Country: Angola

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: TH/MB/GP undated

Date of main report: [No date recorded]
Name of source: INAROEE

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast

Ground condition: sandy

Date record created: 23/01/2004

Date last modified: 23/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate equipment (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate area marking (?)

Accident report
An undated accident report was on file at the Angolan MAC. Written in Portuguese by a team
including an ex-pat Training Officer assigned to the group involved in the accident, the
following summarises its content.
The report stated that the accident area was mined with PPM-2s laid in defence of water
tanks, and its perimeter was fenced with barbed wire. The Board of Inquiry visited the site on
15th and 16th of July [text actually recorded “June”] 1998. Demining had ceased after the
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accident. The ground was flat with sparse vegetation and the soil was sandy and compact
allowing the use of a mine detector. However, the extent of metal contamination made
detecting unfeasible for the type of mines already encountered. The deminers were clearing
exploratory lanes to find the direction and density of the minefield. It was found that type
PPM-2 AP mines had been laid 2m apart and in the pattern of a semi-circle.
At 07:30, [or 08:15 elsewhere] having only cleared a meter, the victim noticed that the
marking stakes ahead of him were out of alignment so went into the adjoining exploratory
lane to reposition them. He pushed a stake onto a mine that was on the border of the lane. He
suffered light injuries on both arms. A quantity of earth was thrown up into his eyes, the skin
of his face was lacerated and his right hand became inflamed. He was not wearing a visor. No
one else was injured.
The paramedics attended the victim before he was taken to hospital in Uige where he was
"put on a drip". The local hospital did not have medication suitable for the treatment of the
victim's injuries. Later that day he was "flown" to Luanda Military Hospital. At the time of the
report the victim had already recovered his sight.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the victim was negligent because he did not inspect the lane
before starting work. They found no weaknesses in the training of the persons involved but
observed that the marking of the minefield prevented adequate control and that the base lane
was 1m wide instead of 2m wide. They also noted that a number of openings into the
minefield were not marked and concluded that there were failings in the system of command
and control by the Section Chief.
A separate conclusion was that a delay in receipt of salaries had affected the morale of the
deminers.

Recommendations
The investigators did not think it necessary to modify training or SOPs. They recommended
that other excavation equipment be used because deminers reported their current trowel was
too heavy, and on hard ground they preferred to use bayonets. They further recommended
that mined area markings be corrected and that the base lane should be completed to a width
of 2m before demining was resumed.

Victim Report
Victim number: 70

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arms
minor Eyes
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minor Face
minor Hand
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
was operating in breach of SOPs but went uncorrected.
Unusually, the accident investigators identified their own primary causes of the accident. They
blamed the failure of demining group managers to ensure that the deminers were paid and
the issue of inappropriate excavation tools. Accordingly, the secondary cause is listed as a
“Management/control inadequacy”.
The failure to clear to the edge of the lane and an overlap was not identified by the
investigators.
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